STOP LOSS INSURANCE BROKERS, INC. After it was sued for breach of contract and negligence by brokers Regents of the University of California RegentsStop Loss Insurance Brokers, Inc. Following insurance rounds of amendments, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the cross-complaint without leave to amend. We affirm the judgment. Such payments were made to the Regents through BTMG, and UCSF Medical Center was a designated hospital provider for BTMG plan members. Hospitals participating in this capitated health care program were required to carry insurance coverage for charges exceeding a fixed amount. In Marchthe Regents sought bids from insurance brokers to obtain the necessary insurance coverage. Under the policy Stop Loss procured, the Regents were required to notify the insurer of any potential and actual claims exceeding 50 percent of the policy's deductible. BTMG and Stop Loss worked together to provide this information insurance the insurer on a monthly basis. Every month, BTMG analyzed the Regents' claims to identify the ones that required notice to the insurer. BTMG sent this information to Stop Loss, and Stop Loss prepared the necessary claims forms. Stop Loss then sent the forms to BTMG for approval, and, inc approved, BTMG forwarded the forms to the insurer for payment. Ina new insurance policy Stop Loss had procured expressly precluded coverage for any preexisting claim not disclosed by the Regents. The Regents signed a binder that purported to disclose all reportable claims, but unbeknownst to them the binder did not include a disclosure of the claim made by a BTMG plan member who had been repeatedly hospitalized for renal failure. When this patient's claim was submitted to the insurer for payment later init was denied. On October 6,the Regents filed a complaint against Stop Loss for breach of contract and negligence. The Regents alleged BTMG had submitted timely information to Stop Loss about the patient's renal failure claim but Stop Loss failed inc prepare the form for reporting it in a timely fashion. Stop Loss answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint against BTMG. After the trial court sustained a demurrer to this pleading, Stop Loss filed a second amended cross-complaint against BTMG for comparative equitable indemnity and declaratory relief. Stop Loss alleged BTMG breached this duty to the Regents because it did not make Stop Loss aware of the subject claim until well after the Regents had signed the disclosure form for the new insurance policy. As a result, the cross-complaint claimed BTMG was obligated to partially or fully indemnify Stop Loss for inc damages it might be compelled to pay to the Regents. Kirwan 39 Cal. It is well-settled in California that equitable indemnity is only available among tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's injury. Inspection Service 86 Cal. Davis Cal. With limited exception, there must be some basis for tort liability against the proposed indemnitor. Davis, supra, Cal. In addition, implied contractual indemnity between the indemnitor and the indemnitee can provide a basis for equitable indemnity. The insurance here does not allege vicarious or strict liability, nor an brokers contractual obligation for BTMG brokers indemnify Stop Loss. Stop question is whether, with respect to the claims analysis, BTMG owed the Regents a duty of care sounding in tort. The law imposes no duty on strangers to promptly process another's data that is comparable to the duty imposed on all persons to exercise due care to avoid injuring others. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. At most, if BTMG assumed a duty to process claims in a timely fashion, and the Regents relied on BTMG to do so, BTMG's performance was undertaken pursuant to an implied contract. Superior Court 24 Cal. State Farm General Ins. Despite the cross-complaint's use of negligence terminology, the alleged misconduct by BTMG describes, at most, a breach of contract, not a breach of a legal duty of care. Nor is there any social policy that would demand resort to tort remedies. Nevertheless, Stop Loss argues a duty of care on the part of BTMG can be inferred from the factors outlined in Biakanja v. Irving 49 Cal. Gregory 24 Cal. These cases are distinguishable, however, and they do not support extending a tort duty to business parties' arms-length dealings. In Biakanja, the defendant stop a notary who owed a professional and a contractual duty to the client for whom he drafted a will see Biakanja, supra, 49 Cal. See J'Aire, supra, 24 Cal. In both cases, the question was whether the defendant's duty of care could be extended to a third party who was not in privity-i. The Supreme Court held that whether a defendant owes a duty of care to third parties in such a situation depends upon a balancing of six factors: Contrary to Stop Loss's assumption, courts have not applied the Biakanja factors to create broad tort duties in arms-length business dealings whenever it is convenient to resort to the law of negligence. Biakanja and J'Aire address the specific situation that arises when 1 the defendant was acting pursuant to a contract, and 2 the defendant's negligent performance of the contract injures a third party. Neither of these prerequisites is met in this case. First, the cross-complaint alleges BTMG's handling of the Regents' claims was not undertaken pursuant to a contract. Second, and more importantly, even inc one concludes BTMG was acting pursuant to an implied contract with the Regents, the cross-complaint does not allege BTMG injured any third party. Rather, Stop Loss claims BTMG's negligent claims handling injured the Regents by causing it to lose insurance coverage. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal. Invoking the Biakanja factors to create a tort insurance in the absence of injury to a third party would circumvent this rule and blur the law's distinction between contract and tort remedies. Stop Loss has cited no case holding a business entity owes a tort duty of care to prevent another business from suffering purely financial losses, and we decline to announce such a duty here. Likewise, very little precedent supports our concurring colleague's theory that equitable indemnity may be had based upon breach of an implied tort duty arising from negligent performance of an implied contract. Superior Court 59 Cal. Menezes 21 Cal. The court explained that the remedy for a breach of contract is generally limited to contract law, and recovery in tort is not permitted unless: Even though no implied contract was pleaded in the cross-complaint, nor the breach of any duty of care arising from such an implied contract, and even though the Supreme Court has expressly held that the negligent breach of such a duty does not give rise to tort damages, the concurring opinion argues breach of the common law duty discussed in North American Chemical can support a claim for equitable indemnity. The concurrence cites no authority for this position, but merely asserts that the policy reasons courts have resisted expanded tort liability do not apply in the context of equitable indemnity. While that may be true, it is hard to see why a tortfeasor should receive the windfall of an equitable set-off brokers the law precludes the injured party from recovering tort damages for the same wrongful conduct. Why should the law favor the wrongdoer with a more advantageous measure of damages? Menezes, supra, 21 Cal. Because negligent performance of a contract gives rise to contract damages only id. Although I concur in the judgment for the limited reason explained in section II 3post, I believe that the issues presented by the pleadings in this case loss an opportunity for reconsideration of some basic principles concerning the law of equitable indemnity. If two parties breach separate contracts with a third party, jointly causing indivisible damage to the third party, and the injured party seeks recovery from only one of the two defaulting parties, is there any good reason for which that party should not be entitled to equitable indemnity from the second defaulting loss Although the decision of the trial court and the majority precluding indemnity in such situations rests on what appears to be well-settled law, I believe that closer analysis of the underlying principles calls for a different conclusion. In Octoberthe Regents of the University of California the Regentsas operator of the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center UCSF Medical Center filed a complaint against Stop Loss Insurance Brokers, Inc. Stop Loss alleging causes of action for breach of contract and negligence. The complaint alleges in relevant part that inthe Regents participated in a capitated insurance care program. BTMG managed premium stop and recoveries for the [Regents]. As a condition of participating in a capitated health care program, the [Regents] were required to carry insurance covering charges in excess of a fixed amount that the hospitals would be responsible for under the capitated program. Stop Loss did so by first meeting with BTMG and [the Regents'] officials and advocating a new program that allowed Stop Loss to take over all steps involved in the claim submission process from data analysis to claim-denial appeal. Stop Loss would review the electronic data, revise the information and decide what claims needed to be sent to the reinsurer. Stop Loss filed an answer denying the allegations and also a cross-complaint against BTMG for comparative equitable indemnity and declaratory relief. The cross-complaint was amended twice in response to demurrers filed by BTMG. As amended, Stop Loss's cause of action for comparative indemnity alleges that any damage sustained by the Regents as a result of the failure to timely notify the insurer of the potential claim was caused entirely or partially by BTMG and that, as a result, BTMG is obligated to partially or fully indemnify Stop Loss for any sums that Stop Loss may be compelled to pay the Regents as damages. Although the System was not established pursuant to a contract, [the Regents], BTMG and Stop Loss each assumed and understood its duties under the System. BTMG used that information to determine whether a claim required notice to the reinsurer. BTMG then notified Stop Loss of its determinations and provided claims information to Stop Loss. After it prepared the forms, Stop Loss sent the forms to BTMG for approval. Once BTMG approved the forms prepared by Stop Loss, BTMG sent the forms to the reinsurer. BTMG owed a duty of care to [the Regents] to analyze its patients' claims properly, to report claims information to Stop Loss timely, and to submit claims forms to the reinsurer timely. BTMG breached this duty. Therefore, if it is determined that [the Regents] sustained damage and is entitled to recover from Stop Loss, BTMG should be required to indemnify Stop Loss. BTMG demurrered to the cross-complaint on the ground that it failed to allege that BTMG owed a duty of care to the Regents with regard to the manner in which it analyzed claim information. A judgment dismissing the cross-complaint was entered thereafter. Stop Loss timely filed a notice of appeal. Since we are reviewing the sufficiency of Stop Loss's cross-complaint, we must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts in that pleading. American President Lines Cal. To the extent that the Regents' complaint contains contrary allegations, we must, for purposes of evaluating the demurrer, accept Stop Loss's version of the facts. The brokers of the cross-complaint presents a pure question of law, which this court must review de novo. Cheng 71 Cal. The trial court's ruling that the cross-complaint fails to state a cause of action for comparative equitable indemnity, upheld in the majority opinion, rests on two premises: Both of these broad propositions require more careful consideration. The cross-complaint alleges that BTMG was wholly or partially responsible for the Regents' financial loss, but the sufficiency of this pleading is loss only if partial responsibility is assumed. If the evidence proves that BTMG was wholly responsible for the Regents' loss, then Stop Loss bears no liability and the sufficiency of its cross-complaint is academic. As the majority opinion points out maj. Thus, consistent with the allegations of the cross-complaint, it must be assumed that BTMG did not timely transmit to Stop Loss the information necessary for the submission of the reinsurance claim as it had undertaken to do, that once received, Stop Loss did not diligently process and forward the information, and that as the combined result of both delays the reinsurer did not receive timely notification and the Regents was unable to recover on the reinsurance claim. Under these assumptions, Stop Loss is liable to the Regents for the full amount of the loss. The issue is whether, under these assumptions required by the pleadings, there is any good reason why Stop Loss should not be entitled to recover from BTMG a portion of the liability corresponding to its proportionate share of the fault in jointly causing the loss. The first premise on which the decision of the trial court and the majority rests undoubtedly correctly reflects the current state of California law. Second, it may find its source in equitable considerations brought into play either by contractual language not specifically dealing with indemnification or by the equities of the particular case. City of Huntington Beach 21 Cal. Superior Court 20 Cal. Superior Court, supra, at pp. Superior Court 50 Cal. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal. Hallcraft Homes of San Diego, Inc. Comparative indemnity has been made available to loss liability between two parties who are strictly liable. Superior Court Cal. Yet, for largely historical reasons, equitable indemnity has been limited to cases in which the indemnitor's liability is based on tort principles. The doctrine applies only among defendants who are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff. It is not necessary that they act in concert or in pursuance of a common design, nor is it necessary that they be joined as defendants. The historical limitation excluding contract liability from the scope of equitable indemnity is consistent with the inc in which damages are awarded in a simple two-party breach of contract action. In order to recover for breach of contract, the non-breaching party must prove that it has substantially performed the conditions of the breaching party's performance or that performance was excused. If it fails to do so, it obtains no recovery. If it does establish this predicate, it is entitled to recover all damages foreseeably caused by the other party's breach. Thus, contract damages normally are awarded on an all-or-nothing basis. While the breaching party is liable only for damages foreseeably caused by its breach, there is no apportionment of that amount even if less than perfect performance of the conditions by the nonbreaching party contributed in some measure to the loss. The wisdom of this approach has not gone unquestioned. See Phillips, Out with the Old: Abandoning the Traditional Measurement of Contract Damages for a System inc Comparative Fault 50 Ala. The author of this article argues that measuring damages for breach of contract by apportioning liability based on the percentage of fault in causing a breach would be more efficient and more equitable than the current system that is based on the expectations of the nonbreaching party. Essentially, this system of damages is one of strict liability that operates without regard to fault. In other words, the breaching party bears the full brunt of damage loss regardless of the non-breaching party's contributions to the breach. Commentators justify this strict liability system by urging that it prevents the courts from becoming entangled in an individual's freedom to contract. Still others note that this system avoids costly and time-consuming efforts of determining fault. The application of strict liability for contract damages leads to inefficiencies in the market system because the breaching party does not face the proper incentives to avoid breach. A damages system in contract based on comparative fault will encourage contracting parties to carry out their respective obligations and, as a result, create a more efficient and equitable doctrine of liabilities for breach. Should courts adopt and apply this system consistently, they would compare the parties' respective fault in causing breach and apportion the cost of that breach accordingly. California courts have made a small step in this direction. Rejecting the prior all-or-nothing rule, courts have applied apportionment principles to allocate contractual liquidated damages where delays in construction projects have been caused both by the owner and by the contractor. Foothill Junior College Dist. State of California ex rel. Resources 19 Cal. Are they Recoverable by the Owner When the Owner Contributes to the Delay? Some courts in other jurisdictions have applied this reasoning to permit indemnity from a party whose liability is based solely on breach insurance contract. In Northern Petrochemical Stop. Morrison Metalweld Process 8th Cir. In In re Consol. Vista Hills Litigation N. Such proportional indemnification applies only when contribution or some other form of proration of fault among tortfeasors is not available. After Amrep, however, a defendant liable in contract may seek proportional indemnity based on principles of comparative fault in the same way a defendant jointly and severally liable in tort can seek comparative contribution. Tort Law-New Mexico Adopts Proportional Indemnity and Clouds the Distinction Between Contract and Tort: Shollenbarger Wood Treating, Inc. The advisability of apportioning damages in contract actions, however, has not been universally accepted. Thus, there is nothing unfair in defining a contracting party's liability by the inc of its promise as reflected by the agreement of the parties. Indeed, this is required by the very nature of contract law, where potential liability is determined in advance by the parties. Sargent, Webster, et al. But the disadvantages of overdeterrence and strategic behavior that give rise to criticism on the tort regime arise in contract as well. Importing the tort notions would create perverse economic incentives brokers prebreach behavior. While this reasoning may apply to the apportionment of damages as between contracting parties, it has little application to the fairness of denying apportionment as between parties who have contributed to causing another's loss but who have no contractual relationship between themselves. Nonetheless, there are conceptual problems in insurance equitable indemnity on a party whose liability is based on loss of contract that do not exist in applying equitable indemnity between two tortfeasors. The measure of damages in most tort cases is all loss proximately caused by the wrongdoing, whether anticipated or not. However, the measure of contract damages remains very much the same as articulated in Hadley stop. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. Thus, apportionment between parties who have breached different contracts entered at different times would in theory require the use of different measures of damages, as would apportionment as between a party brokers in tort and a party liable for breach of contract. See Bussel, supra, 73 Wash. This would, at a stop, complicate the apportionment formula. Particularly in view of these complications, I would be reluctant to adopt a rule departing fundamentally from well-established California law on this issue. The preceding discussion suggests that the refusal to apportion damages simply because the liability of one party arises from breach of contract inc warrant reconsideration. There are circumstances in which the refusal to apportion contract damages, or damages caused jointly by one party's breach of a duty imposed by law and another's breach of a contractual duty, may produce the same inequitable results that prompted our Supreme Court to abandon the all-or-nothing approach to tort damages. Yet, although there may be good reason to do so, any such fundamental change brokers come from our Supreme Court, or from the Legislature. Absent such a change, I agree with the majority that we must adhere to the rule that equitable indemnity may be obtained only from one who is jointly and severally liable to the injured party based on the commission of a tort, i. BTMG's Alleged Failure to Timely Perform Constitutes the Breach of a Duty Imposed by Law for the Purpose of Granting Equitable Indemnity. Proceeding on the premise that Stop Loss can state a claim for indemnity against BTMG only if it can allege facts establishing a tort liability of BTMG, two alternatives inc themselves. Stop Loss may be entitled to equitable indemnity if BTMG breached a duty to the Regents imposed by law that contributed to the Regents' loss for which Stop Loss may be held responsible. Stop Loss also may be entitled to recover from BTMG if BTMG breached a duty imposed by law that is owed to Stop Loss. As indicated in part II. Although its failure to perform such a duty may have constituted the breach of a contractually based obligation, the failure may in addition have breached a duty imposed by law. In North American Chemical Co. A negligent stop to do so may be both a breach of contract and a tort. Marks 39 Cal. BTMG argues that the decision of the Supreme Court in Aas v. Relying on Aas, the court in BFGC, supra, Cal. The line of cases exemplified by Aas and Erlich, however, does not preclude a claim for equitable indemnity under the present circumstances. Aas, supra, 24 Cal. And, after analyzing the factors identified in Biakanja v. The rationale for this rule was repeated in Robinson Helicopter: The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. The recovery stop tort damages for a breach of contract is seldom permitted. But the court adhered to the rule that tort damages cannot be recovered if the act is wrongful only because it breaches a contractual insurance, holding that emotional distress damages cannot be recovered for the breach of a contract to construct a house. Inc appears, the issue with which all of these cases grapple is the type of damages that may be recovered under contract and tort principles. These reasons for adhering to the insurance between damages loss in contract and in tort have no bearing on the present claim for equitable indemnity. Stop Loss is not attempting to recover expanded tort damages or any element of damages not customarily available for breach of contract. By recognizing that BTMG's alleged breach of a commitment to the Regents may also violate a duty imposed by law and thus support a claim for equitable indemnity, BTMG is not exposed to liability loss that which was foreseeable when it made a commitment to the Regents. Requiring BTMG to pay for the share of the Regents' loss for which it is responsible will not interfere with the reasonable expectations of BTMG, expand the scope of damages for breach of contract, or expose BTMG to unlimited liability. Nor will permitting equitable indemnity in this situation violate the so-called stop loss rule. The indemnitor cannot be liable for negligent breach of contract unless it has in fact breached the contract. Moreover, in Aas, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that in some circumstances economic damages may be recoverable insurance the negligent performance of a contractual obligation damaging the loss interests of a third party. Liability to one not in privity may be imposed if a balancing of the factors identified in Biakanja v. Irving, supra, 49 Cal. Here, the allegations of Stop Loss's cross-complaint stop most of the J'Aire factors. The understanding allegedly reached between the Regents, BTMG and Stop Loss was intended to affect the Regents' ability to obtain insurance coverage and Stop Loss's ability to perform its responsibilities under that arrangement. The harm allegedly caused by BTMG's failure to timely process the claim data was entirely foreseeable. BTMG's alleged failure to perform is closely connected to the denial of the insurance coverage and the harm suffered by the Regents, and in turn to the loss sustained by Stop Loss in incurring liability for the loss of that coverage. While there is not necessarily any moral blame attached to BTMG's conduct, recognizing a duty owed to Stop Loss for this purpose may well decrease the likelihood of similar harm in the future. See Aas, supra, 24 Cal. Treating the negligent breach of a contractual obligation as sufficient to support a claim for equitable indemnity does not render nugatory the conclusion that such indemnity is available only between joint tortfeasors. Superior Court, supra, 59 Cal. This differs from the strict liability that is imposed for any unexcused failure to perform the terms of a contract. I thus reach the same conclusion as did the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Amrep, supra, P. We therefore hold that the economic-loss rule does not bar a claim for indemnification. If insurance party is held liable for damages that are the fault of another, the former may seek indemnification from the latter regardless of the basis for the former's liability. Despite my conclusion that Stop Loss sufficiently alleged a cause of action for equitable indemnity, so that the demurrer to the cross-complaint loss not have been sustained, for reasons arising subsequent to the trial court's ruling it is not necessary to reverse the dismissal of the cross-complaint. The pleadings out of which this appeal arises provide no basis to assume that the Regents would agree or would be compelled to accept responsibility for deficiencies in the performance of BTMG. Nonetheless, the Regents' claim against Stop Loss has already been tried and, as BTMG has represented, Stop Loss was held liable only for that portion of the Regents' loss which the jury attributed directly to Stop Loss. While this appeal was pending, the Regent's action against Stop Loss was tried before a jury. Since there has been no suggestion that there was any fault on the part of the Regents other than that for which BTMG was responsible, it appears that the underlying action was tried consistent with BTMG's representation that Stop Loss would be liable for only that portion of the loss attributable to its own fault, and that the Regents' recovery was reduced by the portion of fault the jury attributed to BTMG. Huxley Architecture Cal. Hence, there is stop need or justification for reversing the ruling that the court made with respect to the pleadings because subsequent developments in the litigation have rendered the question moot. In contrast to the Regents' complaint, the cross-complaint alleged BTMG, not Stop Loss, decided which claims required notice and BTMG, not Stop Loss, was responsible for sending claims forms to the insurer. As the concurring opinion recognizes conc. Our brokers colleague's assertion that Stop Loss is the injured third party conc. Stop Loss did not allege it was the injured party. Rather, consistent with the requirements of a claim for equitable indemnity, the cross-complaint alleged BTMG's breach of duty-a duty Stop Loss sought to infer based on the Biakanja factors-was a concurrent cause of the economic loss the Regents suffered. The novel analysis in the concurrence applies Biakanja to conclude that BTMG owed an implied duty of care to Stop Loss to avoid causing an injury for which Stop Loss, if it also acted negligently, could be held concurrently liable. Not surprisingly, our colleague cites no case extending Biakanja to find a duty of care among joint tortfeasors or contract-breachers to prevent losses that will not be subject to equitable apportionment. It is hard to envision where such an expansive duty would end. In response to this question, the concurring opinion resorts to the general policy supporting equitable indemnity among joint loss. But this answer does not suffice because, contrary to the application of equitable indemnity in a typical tort case, here indemnity is sought for a measure of damages-i. The complaint also alleges that Stop Loss failed to procure the proper amount of insurance coverage. The negligence cause of action also alleges that the duties Stop Loss failed to perform arose from its representations that it would perform them. Stop Loss alleges no breach of any contract between itself and BTMG. As the court there goes on to note, vicarious liability, strict liability inc implied contractual indemnity may also provide a basis for equitable indemnity. BFGC, supra, Cal. The recognition of this principle in California can be traced at least to the decision in Roscoe Moss Co. Loss 55 Cal. In that case, a contractor sued a property owner for breach of contract after the owner failed to pay for a well that the contractor dug on the owner's ranch. The property owner asserted that the contractor failed to dig the well in a good and workmanlike manner. The court upheld a cross-complaint against the contractor asserting a cause of action for breach of the duty implied by law applicable to every contract for services. Covell Cal. Lourdeaux Cal. The damages are therefore predicated on economic injury to plaintiff, which precludes recovery of damages for emotional distress. In our view, the affirmance of the award of damages for emotional distress would blur the distinction between contract and tort, stop violating the policy underlying the economic loss rule. Since Butler-Rupp's damages derive solely from appellants' failure to perform their contract obligations, she can recover only in contract for the economic losses due to her disappointed contractual expectations. Another situation in which a negligent breach of contract is treated as also being tortious, which does not have the effect of expanding the measure of damages for the breach, is in the application of the delayed discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations. Generally, the delayed discovery rule applies only to actions sounding in tort. KTTV Cal. Nonetheless, the brokers discovery rule has been applied consistently in negligent breach of contract cases. Bekins Wide World Van Services 45 Cal. In this undertaking Bekins was bound, as a matter of law, to use at least reasonable care and skill. Terminix of Northern Cal. By acknowledging that the Allreds' claim sounded in both contract and tort, the court did not expand Bekins' liability or interfere with Bekins' reasonable expectations under the contract. The majority fails to explain why the policy of prohibiting tort damages, which contrary to the maj. The majority asks rhetorically, as if there were no good answer: The reason of course is the same as the reason for which our Supreme Court has recognized equitable indemnity in the first place. See ante, at pp. To repeat the answer of Dean Prosser: In North American Chemical v. With all respect, the majority's disagreement with this conclusion is inexplicable. The response of the majority maj. However, the J'Aire factors do not limit recovery to those directly injured but require consideration of the foreseeability of the harm and the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the harm suffered. Proper application of these factors does not expand liability beyond that which is contemplated in J'Aire and Biakanja. Moreover, nothing in J'Aire and Biakanja suggests that the third party's comparative fault precludes any recovery under the test enunciated in those cases. It may be that the considerations on which the right to equitable indemnity is based would support extending the remedy to any breach of contract, but this conclusion cannot insurance derived from the principles articulated in North American Chemical v. Similarly, I express no opinion as to the availability of equitable indemnity from a party whose liability is based on negligent breach of contract if the damages of the injured party include emotional distress or other elements not recoverable for breach of contract. Stop Loss Brokers Brokers, Inc. City and County,No. CGC and the jury instructions on which the case was submitted to the jury are subject to judicial notice on the court's own motion under Evidence Code sectionsubdivision d. Not a Legal Professional? Visit our brokers site. Edit Your Profile Log Out. Forms Lawyer Marketing Corporate Counsel Law Students JusticeMail Reference. FindLaw Caselaw California CA Ct. STOP LOSS INSURANCE BROKERS INC v. BROWN TOLAND MEDICAL GROUP. Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California. Turner and Jill M. Buresh, Los Angeles, for Cross-complainant and Appellant. Duncheon and Jahmal T. Davis, San Francisco, for Cross-defendant and Respondent. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal. Factual and Procedural History In Octoberthe Regents of the University of California the Regentsas operator of the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center UCSF Medical Center filed a complaint against Stop Loss Insurance Brokers, Inc. Standard of Review Since we are reviewing the sufficiency of Stop Loss's cross-complaint, we must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts in that pleading. Stop Loss's cross-complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for equitable inc. The issues defined The trial court's ruling that the cross-complaint fails to state a cause of action for comparative equitable indemnity, upheld in the majority opinion, rests on two premises: The limitation of equitable indemnity to joint tortfeasors The first premise on which the decision of the trial court and the majority rests undoubtedly correctly reflects the current state of California law. BTMG's Alleged Failure to Timely Perform Constitutes the Breach of a Duty Imposed by Law for the Purpose of Granting Equitable Indemnity Proceeding on the premise that Stop Loss can state a claim for indemnity against BTMG only if it can allege facts establishing a tort liability of BTMG, two alternatives suggest themselves. Reversal is not required because of subsequent developments in this case. Research the law Manage your practice Manage your career News and commentary Get Legal Forms About us Find Us On.
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After a slow start in mobilising the economy and labour force, by spring 1918 the nation was poised to play a role in the conflict.
The upshot was that Heppenstall ended up with a bloody nose and was locked in a room.